Bahrain and the Battle Between Iran and Saudi Arabia

By George Friedman

The world’s attention is focused on Libya, which is now in a state of civil war with the winner far from clear. While crucial for the Libyan people and of some significance to the world’s oil markets, in our view, Libya is not the most important event in the Arab world at the moment. The demonstrations in Bahrain are, in my view, far more significant in their implications for the region and potentially for the world. To understand this, we must place it in a strategic context.
As STRATFOR has been saying for quite a while, a decisive moment is approaching, with the United States currently slated to withdraw the last of its forces from Iraq by the end of the year. Indeed, we are already at a point where the composition of the 50,000 troops remaining in Iraq has shifted from combat troops to training and support personnel. As it stands now, even these will all be gone by Dec. 31, 2011, provided the United States does not negotiate an extended stay. Iraq still does not have a stable government. It also does not have a military and security apparatus able to enforce the will of the government (which is hardly of one mind on anything) on the country, much less defend the country from outside forces.

Filling the Vacuum in Iraq

 

The decision to withdraw creates a vacuum in Iraq, and the question of the wisdom of the original invasion is at this point moot. The Iranians previously have made clear that they intend to fill this vacuum with their own influence; doing so makes perfect sense from their point of view. Iran and Iraq fought a long and brutal war in the 1980s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran is now secure on all fronts save the western. Tehran’s primary national security imperative now is to prevent a strong government from emerging in Baghdad, and more important, a significant military force from emerging there. Iran never wants to fight another war with Iraq, making keeping Iraq permanently weak and fragmented in Tehran’s interest. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq sets the stage for Iran to pursue this goal, profoundly changing the regional dynamic.
Iran has another, more challenging strategic interest, one it has had since Biblical times. That goal is to be the dominant power in the Persian Gulf.
For Tehran, this is both reasonable and attainable. Iran has the largest and most ideologically committed military of any state in the Persian Gulf region. Despite the apparent technological sophistication of the Gulf states’ militaries, they are shells. Iran’s is not. In addition to being the leading military force in the Persian Gulf, Iran has 75 million people, giving it a larger population than all other Persian Gulf states combined.
Outside powers have prevented Iran from dominating the region since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, first the United Kingdom and then the United States, which consistently have supported the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. It was in the outsiders’ interests to maintain a divided region, and therefore in their interests to block the most powerful country in the region from dominating even when the outsiders were allied with Iran.
With the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, this strategy is being abandoned in the sense that the force needed to contain Iran is being withdrawn. The forces left in Kuwait and U.S air power might be able to limit a conventional Iranian attack. Still, the U.S. withdrawal leaves the Iranians with the most powerful military force in the region regardless of whether they acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, in my view, the nuclear issue largely has been an Iranian diversion from the more fundamental issue, namely, the regional balance after the departure of the United States. By focusing on the nuclear issue, these other issues appeared subsidiary and have been largely ignored.
The U.S. withdrawal does not mean that the United States is powerless against Iran. It has been reconstituting a pre-positioned heavy brigade combat team set in Kuwait and has substantial air and naval assets in the region. It also can bring more forces back to the region if Iran is aggressive. But it takes at least several months for the United States to bring multidivisional forces into a theater and requires the kind of political will that will be severely lacking in the United States in the years ahead. It is not clear that the forces available on the ground could stop a determined Iranian thrust. In any case, Iraq will be free of American troops, allowing Iran to operate much more freely there.
And Iran does not need to change the balance of power in the region through the overt exercise of military force. Its covert capability, unchecked by American force, is significant. It can covertly support pro-Iranian forces in the region, destabilizing existing regimes. With the psychology of the Arab masses changing, as they are no longer afraid to challenge their rulers, Iran will enjoy an enhanced capacity to cause instability.
As important, the U.S. withdrawal will cause a profound shift in psychological perceptions of power in the region. Recognition of Iran’s relative power based on ground realities will force a very different political perception of Iran, and a desire to accommodate Tehran. The Iranians, who understand the weakness of their military’s logistics and air power, are pursuing a strategy of indirect approach. They are laying the foundation for power based on a perception of greater Iranian power and declining American and Saudi power.

Bahrain, the Test Case

 

Bahrain is the perfect example and test case. An island off the coast of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are linked by a causeway. For most purposes, Bahrain is part of Saudi Arabia. Unlike Saudi Arabia, it is not a major oil producer, but it is a banking center. It is also the home of the U.S. 5th Fleet, and has close ties to the United States. The majority of its population is Shia, but its government is Sunni and heavily linked to Saudi Arabia. The Shiite population has not fared as well economically as Shia in other countries in the region, and tensions between the government and the public have long existed.
The toppling of the government of Bahrain by a Shiite movement would potentially embolden Shia in Saudi Arabia, who live primarily in the oil-rich northeast near Bahrain. It also would weaken the U.S. military posture in the region. And it would demonstrate Iranian power.
If the Saudis intervened in Bahrain, the Iranians would have grounds to justify their own intervention, covert or overt. Iran might also use any violent Bahraini government suppression of demonstrators to justify more open intervention. In the meantime, the United States, which has about 1,500 military personnel plus embassy staff on the ground in Bahrain, would face the choice of reinforcing or pulling its troops out.
Certainly, there are internal processes under way in Bahrain that have nothing to do with Iran or foreign issues. But just as the internal dynamic of revolutions affects the international scene, the international scene affects the internal dynamic; observing just one of the two is not sufficient to understand what is going on.
The Iranians clearly have an interest in overthrowing the Bahraini regime. While the degree to which the Iranians are involved in the Bahraini unrest is unclear, they clearly have a great deal of influence over a cleric, Hassan Mushaima, who recently returned to Bahrain from London to participate in the protests. That said, the Bahraini government itself could be using the unrest to achieve its own political goals, much as the Egyptian military used the Egyptian uprising. Like all revolutions, events in Bahrain are enormously complex — and in Bahrain’s case, the stakes are extremely high.
Unlike Libya, where the effects are primarily internal, the events in Bahrain clearly involve Saudi, Iranian and U.S. interests. Bahrain is also the point where the Iranians have their best chance, since it is both the most heavily Shiite nation and one where the Shiites have the most grievances. But the Iranians have other targets, which might be defined as any area adjoining Saudi Arabia with a substantial Shiite population and with American bases. This would include Oman, which the United States uses as a support facility; Qatar, headquarters of U.S. Central Command and home to Al Udeid Air Base; and Kuwait, the key logistical hub for Iraqi operations and with major army support, storage and port facilities. All three have experienced or are experiencing demonstrations. Logically, these are Iran’s first targets.
The largest target of all is, of course, Saudi Arabia. That is the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, and its destabilization would change the regional balance of power and the way the world works. Iran has never made a secret of its animosity toward Saudi Arabia, nor vice versa. Saudi Arabia could now be in a vise. There is massive instability in Yemen with potential to spill over into Saudi Arabia’s southern Ismaili-concentrated areas. The situation in Iraq is moving in the Iranians’ favor. Successful regime changes in even one or two of the countries on the littoral of the Persian Gulf could generate massive internal fears regardless of what the Saudi Shia did and could lead to dissension in the royal family. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Saudis are moving aggressively against any sign of unrest among the Shia, arresting dozens who have indicated dissent. The Saudis clearly are uneasy in the extreme.

Iran’s Powerful Position

 

The Iranians would be delighted to cause regime change throughout the region, but that is not likely to occur, at least not everywhere in the region. They would be equally happy simply to cause massive instability in the region, however. With the United States withdrawing from Iraq, the Saudis represent the major supporter of Iraq’s Sunnis. With the Saudis diverted, this would ease the way for Iranian influence in Iraq. At that point, there would be three options: Turkey intervening broadly, something it is not eager to do; the United States reversing course and surging troops into the region to support tottering regimes, something for which there is no political appetite in the United States; and the United States accepting the changed regional balance of power.
Two processes are under way. The first is that Iran will be the single outside power with the most influence in Iraq, not unlimited and not unchallenged, but certainly the greatest. The second is that as the United States withdraws, Iran will be in a position to pursue its interests more decisively. Those interests divide into three parts:

1. eliminating foreign powers from the region to maximize Iranian power,
2. convincing Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region that they must reach an accommodation with Iran or face potentially dangerous consequences, and
3. a redefinition of the economics of oil in the Persian Gulf in favor of Iran, including Iranian participation in oil projects in other Persian Gulf countries and regional investment in Iranian energy development.

The events in the Persian Gulf are quite different from the events in North Africa, with much broader implications. Bahrain is the focal point of a struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for control of the western littoral of the Persian Gulf. If Iran is unable to capitalize on events in Bahrain, the place most favorable to it, the moment will pass. If Bahrain’s government falls, the door is opened to further actions. Whether Iran caused the rising in the first place is unclear and unimportant; it is certainly involved now, as are the Saudis.
The Iranians are in a powerful position whatever happens given the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Combine this with a series of regime changes, or simply destabilization on the border of Saudi Arabia, and two things happen. First, the Saudi regime would be in trouble and would have to negotiate some agreement with the Iranians — and not an agreement the Saudis would like. Second, the U.S. basing position in the Persian Gulf would massively destabilize, making U.S. intervention in the region even more difficult.
The problem created by the U.S. leaving Iraq without having been able to install a strong, pro-American government remains the core issue. The instability in the Persian Gulf allows the Iranians a low-risk, high-reward parallel strategy that, if it works, could unhinge the balance of power in the entire region. The threat of an uprising in Iran appears minimal, with the Iranian government having no real difficulty crushing resistance. The resistance on the western shore of the Persian Gulf may be crushed or dissolved as well, in which case Iran would still retain its advantageous position in Iraq. But if the perfect storm presents itself, with Iran increasing its influence in Iraq and massive destabilization on the Arabian Peninsula, then the United States will face some extraordinarily difficult and dangerous choices, beginning with the question of how to resist Iran while keeping the price of oil manageable.
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"Bahrain and the Battle Between Iran and Saudi Arabia is republished with permission of STRATFOR."

Tarpley: US-UK Imperialist Rampage Envelops Libya in Civil War with Help from "al Qaeda"...

US-UK Imperialist Rampage Envelops Libya in Civil War with Help from "al Qaeda"; Qaddafi Regime Counterattacking; Cameron Pushes Obama for No-Fly Zone, Invasion of Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) to Seize Oil Fields; Russia Calls Stories of Qaddafi Air Force Strafing Protesters Unfounded; Anti-Qaddafi Lynch Mobs Target Black Africans; 30,000 Chinese in Danger; 1995 Shayler Affair Scenario Operative

The Truth About the Middle East Revolutions ∞ David Icke

5 Proposals to Combat ‘Global Warming’ That Should Make Us All Cringe

Eric Blair
Infowars.com
March 1, 2011

Taxing the air we exhale, rationing human necessities, a global one-child policy, geoengineering (high-altitude chemical spraying), and now nuclear war have all been proposed to combat global warming. Have climate theorists lost their marbles, or just their humanity?



There has not been much middle ground found between global warming believers and the “it’s a hoax” crowd. I started as a believer after watching An Inconvenient Truth. I struggled to even look into the alternative view because the establishment had so successfully made the deniers seem insane.
However, having now done extensive research, I can attest that the “hoax” crowd has just as much, if not more, compelling evidence on their side as believers do. Furthermore, most global warming deniers won’t disagree that the climate is changing or shifting in some noticeable way, only that man-made CO2 is not the primary cause.
This article is not intended to debate the questions surrounding the man-made global warming theory, but rather the proposed “solutions.” Most believers genuinely care about the environment and view deniers as selfish “takers” who care not for mother nature. This is not the case at all.  In fact, I would argue that most deniers feel just as passionately about environmental issues as believers.  The difference seems to be that deniers focus their energy on tangible and measurable problems in the environment like water, air and soil pollution, GMO food, excessive pharmaceuticals, chemical spraying, and results from oil spills and gas fracking to name a few.
None of these very real threats to human and environmental health are addressed by the global warming crowd, save for possibly air pollution.  When one dissects the proposals to combat global warming, it seems clear that the environmental movement has been hijacked by CO2 propagandists for an ulterior motive.  Even though hardcore believers seem to have a healthy distrust for bankers, corporations, and their puppet politicians, they have a very difficult time challenging the establishment’s science or solutions pertaining to global warming.  They seem too busy defending the theory to make the connection to what they’re actually supporting — which is a cabal of big banks, big oil, and big brother seeking further control of society by hyping unprovable environmental threats that they never actually intend to fix in the first place.
At the very least, eyebrows should be raised since “hacked” emails exposed that the science data had been manipulated to fit the theory.  Alarm bells should go off when we learn that, as Vice President, Gore designed the proposed Cap and Trade system with Enron’s criminal CEO Ken “Kenny Boy” Lay years before the global warming theory had been introduced to the public. And for progressives, a full blown revolt should take place knowing that the scandalous international Banksters and Big Oil have shaped Cap and Trade to line their pockets. Finally, as with any modern legislative proposal, it is designed as a Robin-Hood-in reverse scheme where provisions appear to tax personal human choices, while major corporate polluters are exempt.
Regardless of what we believe about the man-made global warming theory, it certainly appears that the establishment’s fix fits their problem-reaction-solution model of social engineering where many proposed solutions distort humanity’s moral compass.  Below are 5 proposals to combat global warming that should make all environmentalists and humanitarians cringe with embarrassment for supporting them:
1. Taxes to International Bankers: Does anyone still trust the international bankers after their wholesale looting of the general public?  Do genuine environmentalists actually believe it’s a good thing to have this criminal institution in charge of collecting and regulating carbon taxes. The thought of being forced to give more power and more money to the banks seems utterly foolish to support, no matter what environmental catastrophes we may face.  The carbon market is almost entirely voluntary and is still in its infancy, yet there is already major financial fraud occurring which is par for the course for the banksters.  We should be ashamed to promote them as any part of a solution.
2. One-Child Policies: After vilifying China’s one-child policy since its inception, the Western world is now warming to the idea to combat CO2.  In fact, Canada joined China in publicly calling for a Worldwide One-Child Policy during Copenhagen climate talks in 2009.  Forcing this type of law on a previously free society will surely result in forced abortions and other horrific consequences.  It is the epitome of tyranny for the State to take away such basic rights to life.  It seems that the numerous heavyweights pushing this agenda are hell-bent on population reduction in spite of the global warming theory.  If forcing your friends and neighbors into a one-child policy makes sense to you, you may have already lost your humanity to a theoretical fear.
3. Geoengineering: The AP reported during the 2010 Cancun climate talks that “we may need geoengineering as a ‘Plan B,’ if nations fail to forge agreement on a binding treaty to rein in greenhouse gases.” Geoengineering (sometimes referred to as chemtrailing), is high-altitude chemical spraying.  They are the unnatural crisscrossed long white trails left by planes that take days to dissipate. Their patents are high in nanoparticle aluminum and barium, both of which have been found in dangerously high concentrations in otherwise pristine locations.  For decades this program was top secret, and environmental activists were called conspiracy theorists for questioning it.  Now, it is being promoted as the savior to global warming, claiming the extremely poisonous chemicals reflect sunlight away from earth. To learn more about what you would be advocating for as ‘Plan B’ to stop global warming, please watch the very reputable new film What in the World are They Spraying?
4. Rationing: At the COP16 climate meeting in Cancun during record cold temperatures this winter “Some climate change experts say World War II-style rationing in developed countries may be needed to bring down carbon emissions to fight against global warming.”  We all know who is most affected by rationing:  the average little citizen.  I’m reminded of the character Winston Smith in 1984 getting his allotments of fabricated coffee and fuel-like alcohol while the controllers lived in the lap of luxury.  Perhaps, if we’re lucky, the State will take control of local farm harvests for rationed distribution circa the Soviet Union. Ahh, freedom is on the march with this proposal.
5. Nuclear War: Last, but certainly not least, the idea has been floated that a small nuclear war may save us from the global warming bogeyman.  Yes, for the good of humanity and the environment, let’s blow a couple of million people to smithereens and radiate thousands of square miles to force the cooling of the earth.  This is not some fringe group proposing this, but instead NASA, the National Geographic and Ted Turner-owned Time magazines floating the idea.  They say, “Models suggest that though the world is currently in a warming trend, small-scale war could lower global temperatures 2.25 degrees F for two-to-three years following war.”  It seems this scenario will do nothing to reduce CO2, but simply block and absorb heat from the sun.  In fact, they admit it may add carbon into the atmosphere.  If you can’t tell how wrong this concept is on multiple levels then perhaps it’s more appropriate to refer to you as a world-is-flat Neanderthal.
Despite differences in theories, can’t we all agree that these proposals seem downright tyrannical, if not evil?  They all seem to further crush the poorest among us, while eliminating basic individual rights, to openly promoting reducing the human population. And that means you too by the way.  Believers won’t be exempt from the darkest wrath of these proposals.
And worst of all, none of these proposals will do anything to solve authentic environmental degradation, or even CO2 concentrations for that matter.  So, it’s all right to believe any theory you wish, but just be more informed and honest when defending the establishment’s proposed solutions. They are not designed or intended to protect you or the environment from global warming.

Report: US Special Forces Arrive In Libya

Paul Joseph Watson
Infowars.com
March 1, 2011


Image: Wikimedia Commons

US Special Forces have reportedly landed in Libya to train anti-Gaddafi rebels as a western-backed coup d’état in the oil-rich nation nears, with British and French “defense advisors” also arriving to set up training bases in the rebel-controlled eastern region of the country.
According to a report in the Pakistan Observer, hundreds of special forces personnel from the US, Britain and France arrived on February 23 and 24 in “American and French warships and small naval boats off Libyan ports of Benghazi and Tobruk.”
The article states that the report was confirmed by a Libyan diplomat in the region, who said that “The three Western states have landed their special forces troops in Cyrinacia and are now setting up their bases and training centres,” in a bid to bolster rebel forces resisting Gaddafi’s militia in the surrounding region.
“The Western forces are reportedly preparing to set-up training bases for local militias set-up by the rebel forces for an effective control of the oil-rich region and counter any push by pro-Qaddafi forces from Tripoli,” states the report.
In addition, efforts to “neutralize” the Libyan Air Force are underway in a bid to stymie Gaddafi’s ability to rule from Tripoli if he manages to remain in power.
The US Navy has also confirmed that the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, which had previously been on pirate-hunting duty off the coast of Somalia, is now steaming towards Libya as tensions rise.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly admitted for the first time yesterday that the United States was preparing to back anti-government rebels, despite Hafiz Ghoga, the spokesman for the newly formed National Libyan Council in the rebel controlled eastern city of Benghazi, warning that any “foreign intervention” would not be welcome.

“The rest of Libya will be liberated by the people … and Gaddafi’s security forces will be eliminated by the people of Libya,” Ghoga said during a news conference.
Meanwhile, ex-European representative for the Carlyle Group and former British Prime Minister John Major has become the latest to add his voice to the growing chorus of those calling for military intervention to oust Gaddafi.
Major backed, “Other Western leaders who are on the brink of ordering military action against Col Muammar Gaddafi amid fears that the Libyan dictator could use chemical weapons against his own people,” reports the Telegraph.
Current British Prime Minister David Cameron has also been busy setting the stage for a western-backed coup d’état, calling for a no fly zone to be erected over the country.
“If Col Gaddafi uses military force against his own people, the world cannot stand by. That is why we should be looking at a no-fly zone,” Cameron said. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov blasted the idea of a no fly zone as “superfluous,” instead signaling support for UN-backed sanctions.
On Friday, 40 influential neo-conservatives signed a letter to Barack Obama urging the President to “immediately” prepare military action to overthrow Gaddafi.
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Any regime change achieved with the assistance of western nations will provide deeper access to a country that holds the largest amount of oil reserves in Africa and the tenth largest in the world, with a reserve to production ratio of around 66 years.
—
Paul Joseph Watson is the editor and writer for Prison Planet.com. He is the author of Order Out Of Chaos. Watson is also a fill-in host for The Alex Jones Show. Watson has been interviewed by many publications and radio shows, including Vanity Fair and Coast to Coast AM, America’s most listened to late night talk show.

Max Igan : Stealing The World With Paper

Max Igan - American Voice Radio - 11/26/10 wars are not about bringing freedom , it is about controlling people and resources , nobody wants wars except the elite ....
The International Banking Cartel : its about control of the world and all its resources and eliminating the "useless eaters" .It is a scientific dictatorship. The nazi's used their concentration camps for scientific experiments, got transferred to the US after the war, and then started to work for CIA, NASA, MK-ultra etc... money was created as a tool to control and manipulate people. The truth is that the manipulators need the people far more than the people need the manipulators. They depend completely on our compliance, this fact easy to demonstrate, yet so many good, loving, righteous people ignore the correct choice because they are scared, feared into a reality where their dependence on an outside savior supersedes their faith is themselves..This was a well formed, concise video and positive with all the relevant information .

If the government ends fractional reserve banking and issues debt-free public paper, the government would need to print a lot of money to prevent deflation. enough money to pay off any national debt to legitimate bond holders without a dime of taxation.A promissory note/money/credit in circulation is real to a degree thats how the banks pull of there scam off,interest charged is not real as its never created in the first place ,what is real is the fact interest & principal is getting laundered out of circulation by deception.creation of credit through a fractional system is questionable as a debtor really creates the promissory note via his signature.The bank fraudulently intervenes publishing evidence of OUR promissory notes.

The Bob Chapman Channel - Feb 28 Show

Keiser Report: Middle Class Misery

Celente: Great 21 century war looming, Egypt & Libya just brush fires

Never Fight a Land War in Asia

By George Friedman
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speaking at West Point, said last week that “Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.” In saying this, Gates was repeating a dictum laid down by Douglas MacArthur after the Korean War, who urged the United States to avoid land wars in Asia. Given that the United States has fought four major land wars in Asia since World War II — Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq — none of which had ideal outcomes, it is useful to ask three questions: First, why is fighting a land war in Asia a bad idea? Second, why does the United States seem compelled to fight these wars? And third, what is the alternative that protects U.S. interests in Asia without large-scale military land wars?

The Hindrances of Overseas Wars

 

Let’s begin with the first question, the answer to which is rooted in demographics and space. The population of Iraq is currently about 32 million. Afghanistan has a population of less than 30 million. The U.S. military, all told, consists of about 1.5 million active-duty personnel (plus 980,000 in the reserves), of whom more than 550,000 belong to the Army and about 200,000 are part of the Marine Corps. Given this, it is important to note that the United States strains to deploy about 200,000 troops at any one time in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that many of these troops are in support rather than combat roles. The same was true in Vietnam, where the United States was challenged to field a maximum of about 550,000 troops (in a country much more populous than Iraq or Afghanistan) despite conscription and a larger standing army. Indeed, the same problem existed in World War II.
When the United States fights in the Eastern Hemisphere, it fights at great distances, and the greater the distance, the greater the logistical cost. More ships are needed to deliver the same amount of materiel, for example. That absorbs many troops. The logistical cost of fighting at a distance is that it diverts numbers of troops (or requires numbers of civilian personnel) disproportionate to the size of the combat force.
Regardless of the number of troops deployed, the U.S. military is always vastly outnumbered by the populations of the countries to which it is deployed. If parts of these populations resist as light-infantry guerrilla forces or employ terrorist tactics, the enemy rapidly swells to a size that can outnumber U.S. forces, as in Vietnam and Korea. At the same time, the enemy adopts strategies to take advantage of the core weakness of the United States — tactical intelligence. The resistance is fighting at home. It understands the terrain and the culture. The United States is fighting in an alien environment. It is constantly at an intelligence disadvantage. That means that the effectiveness of the native forces is multiplied by excellent intelligence, while the effectiveness of U.S. forces is divided by lack of intelligence.
The United States compensates with technology, from space-based reconnaissance and air power to counter-battery systems and advanced communications. This can make up the deficit but only by massive diversions of manpower from ground-combat operations. Maintaining a helicopter requires dozens of ground-crew personnel. Where the enemy operates with minimal technology multiplied by intelligence, the United States compensates for lack of intelligence with massive technology that further reduces available combat personnel. Between logistics and technological force multipliers, the U.S. “point of the spear” shrinks. If you add the need to train, relieve, rest and recuperate the ground-combat forces, you are left with a small percentage available to fight.
The paradox of this is that American forces will win the engagements but may still lose the war. Having identified the enemy, the United States can overwhelm it with firepower. The problem the United States has is finding the enemy and distinguishing it from the general population. As a result, the United States is well-suited for the initial phases of combat, when the task is to defeat a conventional force. But after the conventional force has been defeated, the resistance can switch to methods difficult for American intelligence to deal with. The enemy can then control the tempo of operations by declining combat where it is at a disadvantage and initiating combat when it chooses.
The example of the capitulation of Germany and Japan in World War II is frequently cited as a model of U.S. forces defeating and pacifying an opposing nation. But the Germans were not defeated primarily by U.S. ground troops. The back of the Wehrmacht was broken by the Soviets on their own soil with the logistical advantages of short supply lines. And, of course, Britain and numerous other countries were involved. It is doubtful that the Germans would have capitulated to the Americans alone. The force the United States deployed was insufficient to defeat Germany. The Germans had no appetite for continuing a resistance against the Russians and saw surrendering to the Americans and British as sanctuary from the Russians. They weren’t going to resist them. As for Japan, it was not ground forces but air power, submarine warfare and atomic bombs that finished them — and the emperor’s willingness to order a surrender. It was not land power that prevented resistance but air and sea power, plus a political compromise by MacArthur in retaining and using the emperor. Had the Japanese emperor been removed, I suspect that the occupation of Japan would have been much more costly. Neither Germany nor Japan are examples in which U.S. land forces compelled capitulation and suppressed resistance.
The problem the United States has in the Eastern Hemisphere is that the size of the force needed to occupy a country initially is much smaller than the force needed to pacify the country. The force available for pacification is much smaller than needed because the force the United States can deploy demographically without committing to total war is simply too small to do the job — and the size needed to do the job is unknown.

U.S. Global Interests

 

The deeper problem is this: The United States has global interests. While the Soviet Union was the primary focus of the United States during the Cold War, no power threatens to dominate Eurasia now, and therefore no threat justifies the singular focus of the United States. In time of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States must still retain a strategic reserve for other unanticipated contingencies. This further reduces the available force for combat.
Some people argue that the United States is insufficiently ruthless in prosecuting war, as if it would be more successful without political restraints at home. The Soviets and the Nazis, neither noted for gentleness, were unable to destroy the partisans behind German lines or the Yugoslav resistance, in spite of brutal tactics. The guerrilla has built-in advantages in warfare for which brutality cannot compensate.
Given all this, the question is why the United States has gotten involved in wars in Eurasia four times since World War II. In each case it is obvious: for political reasons. In Korea and Vietnam, it was to demonstrate to doubting allies that the United States had the will to resist the Soviets. In Afghanistan, it was to uproot al Qaeda. In Iraq, the reasons are murkier, more complex and less convincing, but the United States ultimately went in, in my opinion, to convince the Islamic world of American will.
The United States has tried to shape events in the Eastern Hemisphere by the direct application of land power. In Korea and Vietnam, it was trying to demonstrate resolve against Soviet and Chinese power. In Afghanistan and Iraq, it was trying to shape the politics of the Muslim world. The goal was understandable but the amount of ground force available was not. In Korea, it resulted in stalemate; in Vietnam, defeat. We await the outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan, but given Gates’ statement, the situation for the United States is not necessarily hopeful.
In each case, the military was given an ambiguous mission. This was because a clear outcome — defeating the enemy — was unattainable. At the same time, there were political interests in each. Having engaged, simply leaving did not seem an option. Therefore, Korea turned into an extended presence in a near-combat posture, Vietnam ended in defeat for the American side, and Iraq and Afghanistan have turned, for the time being, into an uncertain muddle that no reasonable person expects to end with the declared goals of a freed and democratic pair of countries.

Problems of Strategy

 

There are two problems with American strategy. The first is using the appropriate force for the political mission. This is not a question so much of the force as it is of the mission. The use of military force requires clarity of purpose; otherwise, a coherent strategy cannot emerge. Moreover, it requires an offensive mission. Defensive missions (such as Vietnam and Korea) by definition have no terminal point or any criteria for victory. Given the limited availability of ground combat forces, defensive missions allow the enemy’s level of effort to determine the size of the force inserted, and if the force is insufficient to achieve the mission, the result is indefinite deployment of scarce forces.
Then there are missions with clear goals initially but without an understanding of how to deal with Act II. Iraq suffered from an offensive intention ill suited to the enemy’s response. Having destroyed the conventional forces of Iraq, the United States was unprepared for the Iraqi response, which was guerrilla resistance on a wide scale. The same was true in Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency is occupation warfare. It is the need to render a population — rather than an army — unwilling and incapable of resisting. It requires vast resources and large numbers of troops that outstrip the interest. Low-cost counter-insurgency with insufficient forces will always fail. Since the United States uses limited forces because it has to, counterinsurgency is the most dangerous kind of war for the United States. The idea has always been that the people prefer the U.S. occupation to the threats posed by their fellow countrymen and that the United States can protect those who genuinely do prefer the former. That may be the idea, but there is never enough U.S. force available.
Another model for dealing with the problem of shaping political realities can be seen in the Iran-Iraq war. In that war, the United States allowed the mutual distrust of the two countries to eliminate the threats posed by both. When the Iraqis responded by invading Kuwait, the United States responded with a massive counter with very limited ends — the reconquest of Kuwait and the withdrawal of forces. It was a land war in Asia designed to defeat a known and finite enemy army without any attempt at occupation.
The problem with all four wars is that they were not wars in a conventional sense and did not use the military as militaries are supposed to be used. The purpose of a military is to defeat enemy conventional forces. As an army of occupation against a hostile population, military forces are relatively weak. The problem for the United States is that such an army must occupy a country for a long time, and the U.S. military simply lacks the ground forces needed to occupy countries and still be available to deal with other threats.
By having an unclear mission, you have an uncertain terminal point. When does it end? You then wind up with a political problem internationally — having engaged in the war, you have allies inside and outside of the country that have fought with you and taken risks with you. Withdrawal leaves them exposed, and potential allies will be cautious in joining with you in another war. The political costs spiral and the decision to disengage is postponed. The United States winds up in the worst of all worlds. It terminates not on its own but when its position becomes untenable, as in Vietnam. This pyramids the political costs dramatically.
Wars need to be fought with ends that can be achieved by the forces available. Donald Rumsfeld once said, “You go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” I think that is a fundamental misunderstanding of war. You do not engage in war if the army you have is insufficient. When you understand the foundations of American military capability and its limits in Eurasia, Gates’ view on war in the Eastern Hemisphere is far more sound than Rumsfeld’s.

The Diplomatic Alternative

 

The alternative is diplomacy, not understood as an alternative to war but as another tool in statecraft alongside war. Diplomacy can find the common ground between nations. It can also be used to identify the hostility of nations and use that hostility to insulate the United States by diverting the attention of other nations from challenging the United States. That is what happened during the Iran-Iraq war. It wasn’t pretty, but neither was the alternative.
Diplomacy for the United States is about maintaining the balance of power and using and diverting conflict to manage the international system. Force is the last resort, and when it is used, it must be devastating. The argument I have made, and which I think Gates is asserting, is that at a distance, the United States cannot be devastating in wars dependent on land power. That is the weakest aspect of American international power and the one the United States has resorted to all too often since World War II, with unacceptable results. Using U.S. land power as part of a combined arms strategy is occasionally effective in defeating conventional forces, as it was with North Korea (and not China) but is inadequate to the demands of occupation warfare. It makes too few troops available for success, and it does not know how many troops might be needed.
This is not a policy failure of any particular U.S. president. George W. Bush and Barack Obama have encountered precisely the same problem, which is that the forces that have existed in Eurasia, from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Korea to the Taliban in Afghanistan, have either been too numerous or too agile (or both) for U.S. ground forces to deal with. In any war, the primary goal is not to be defeated. An elective war in which the criteria for success are unclear and for which the amount of land force is insufficient must be avoided. That is Gates’ message. It is the same one MacArthur delivered, and the one Dwight Eisenhower exercised when he refused to intervene in Vietnam on France’s behalf. As with the Monroe Doctrine, it should be elevated to a principle of U.S. foreign policy, not because it is a moral principle but because it is a very practical one.


"Never Fight a Land War in Asia is republished with permission of STRATFOR."

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